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1. Introduction 
Many of us rely on simple ‘what if everyone did it?’ 
thinking in ethical deliberation (Hooker 2000: 5). We 
think, for example, that it is wrong to jump a queue 
because not everyone could do so (Parfit 2011: vol. 1, 302–
305). The idea here is that there is something 
fundamentally wrong about making an exception of 
yourself. Thinking in this simple way is, of course, an 
imperfect guide to right and wrong: it is morally 
permissible to dine at a friend’s place at 7pm on Mondays 
even if not everyone could do so (Hooker 2000: 5; Bittner 
1974: 487). Yet, there still is something appealing about 
thinking about morality in this simple way. 
A number of ethical theories attempt to develop the 
previous type of everyday ethical thinking into something 
more systematic and defensible. Instead of considering 
what would happen if everyone acted in one way, they 
tend to focus on the consequences of everyone accepting 
the same moral code (that is, the same set of moral 
principles).1 This solves the previous problem. Even if 
everyone endorses the principle that it is permissible to 
                                                
1 The rules that constitute a moral code need not be simple, absolute, 
and exceptionless principles that can be stated simply in words 
(principles such as ‘Do not kill!’). We can think of a moral code as a 
complex moral sensitivity that can be internalized – that is, as “a 
moral conscience with a certain shape” (Hooker 2000: 91). In this way, 
the relevant sensitivity determines when a given rule applies, what 
exceptions it admits, and what strength it has in conflict cases (Hooker 
2000: 90–91; Scanlon 1998: 197–202). The acceptance of the rule that 
governs killing, for example, includes the disposition for being 
motivated not to kill in a vast number of situations (but perhaps not in 
all), a disposition to have reactive attitudes such as blame towards 
those who kill in most contexts, and so on. 
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dine at a friend’s place at 7pm on Mondays, not everyone 
will want to do so and therefore everyone accepting this 
principle will not have any awkward consequences 
(Hooker 2000: 5). 
These ethical theories must then decide how we should 
evaluate the consequences of everyone accepting the same 
moral code. We can first image a set of possible worlds 
exactly like our own world except that in each one a 
different moral code has been internalized by everyone. 
That is, we can pair each moral code we could internalize 
with a world in which that code has been internalized by 
everyone. 
Different ethical theories then compare the worlds in 
which different moral codes have been internalized in 
different ways. In these worlds, because different moral 
codes have been internalized, individuals come to live 
different kind of lives (Scanlon 1998: 202–206). A basic 
rule-utilitarian theory would first pick out the world that 
contains the highest total amount of well-being (Brandt 
1959: 413–422; Frankena 1973: 39–43). It would then state 
that the moral code internalized in that world determines 
what is right and wrong. On this view, an action is right if 
and only if it is authorized by the moral code the universal 
acceptance of which produces the highest total amount of 
well-being, and wrong otherwise. In the same way, more 
sophisticated rule-consequentialist views pick out the 
world and the moral code that maximize the amount of 
good understood in some more complicated way.2 
A shared feature of all rule-consequentialist views is that, 
when they compare the relevant worlds, they 
interpersonally aggregate together how good the lives of 
different people are in them. These views are then 
interested in the highest sum or the highest average of 
well-being and/or some other values found from these 
worlds. Each individual’s well-being and possibly other 
personal values are merely considered to be elements of 
the compared sums or averages. In contrast, contractualist 
                                                
2 The axiology of the rule-consequentialist can include other intrinsic 
values than well-being and also give priority to the position of the 
worst-off (Hooker 2000: secs. 2.2 and 2.8). 
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theories tend to compare the relevant worlds and their 
moral codes without this type of interpersonal 
aggregation.3  
Here is a sketch of how the non-aggregative contractualist 
comparisons of the relevant worlds and codes work. From 
each world, we first find the individual whose life has 
been burdened the most as the result of the moral code 
that has been internalized by everyone in that world 
(Scanlon 1998: 195 and 208). This is the person whose life 
is the least choice-worthy in that world because of the 
generic and concrete burdens such as bodily injuries, 
inability to rely on the assurances of others, and not 
having control over what happens to her body (Scanlon 
1998: 204). 
We can then stipulate that this person has the most serious 
personal objection to the moral code she lives under on 
the basis of the previous personal burdens. After this, we 
can compare the most serious personal objections of each 
world against one another. Contractualists call the moral 
code to which there is the least serious of these personal 
objections the moral code which no one could reasonably 
reject (Scanlon 1998: 195).4 This is because all other moral 
codes burden individuals in more serious ways than this 
code. The individuals who would have to bear those 
unnecessary serious burdens could reasonably reject the 
code that would cause them those burdens. The claim then 
is that an action is right in our world if and only if it is 
authorized by the moral code which no one could 
reasonably reject, and wrong otherwise (Scanlon 1998: 4 
and 153). 
                                                
3 See Scanlon (1998: 229–241), Parfit (2003: 369) and Ridge (2001).  
4 If there are many codes to which the most serious personal 
objections are equally least serious, we first consider which of these 
worlds contains the fewest of these objections (Scanlon 1998: 232). If 
there are many worlds that contain an equal number of the relevant 
most serious objections, we compare the second most serious 
objections in the same way. If these are tied in both seriousness and 
number, we keep moving to the next levels until we find a unique 
code. If there are many codes that contain an equal number of equally 
serious objections at each level in the previous comparisons, we 




Since the publication of T.M. Scanlon’s What We Owe to 
Each Other, the critics of contractualism have made many 
powerful objections to contractualism. It has been argued 
that (i) contractualism is merely a redundant spare wheel 
in ethical theorising, that (ii) it leads to implausible 
conclusions about how groups should be treated, that (iii) 
it is too demanding, and that (iv) it fails to account for our 
moral obligations that govern how we are to treat animals 
and cognitively impaired human beings.5 Instead of these 
old objections, I want to explore a new one.6 This 
challenge was first formulated by Holly Smith as an 
objection to rule-consequentialism in (Smith 2010: 426–
432). I call it the counter-culture challenge. 
In order to understand this challenge, we must first briefly 
consider at what level of social acceptance the different 
moral codes should be compared.7 Section 2 will explain 
the contractualist responses to this question and how they 
directly lead to the counter-culture challenge. This 
challenge threatens to undermine contractualism in a 
fundamental way because, if it is successful, the 
contractualist framework will be unable to pick out a non-
arbitrary moral code, which would be essential for the 
project of explaining which actions are right and wrong 
                                                
5 For an overview, see Southwood (2003: sec. 3). For discussions of (i), 
see Thomson (1990: 30, n. 19 and 188); Blackburn (1999); and Pettit 
(2000: 162). For discussions of (ii), see Hooker (2003), Kumar (2001), 
Norcross (2002), Otsuka (2000), Parfit (2003), Raz (2003) and Reibetanz 
(1998). For (iii), see Ashford (2003). Finally, for (iv), see Hooker (2000: 
66–70), Carruthers (1992: ch. 4), and Phillips (1998). 
6 Scanlon addressed many of these objections in What We Owe to Each 
Other (Scanlon 1998). See pages 194 and 215–218 (objection (i)), 229–
241 (objection (ii)), 224–225 (objection (iii)), and 177–187 (objection 
(iv)). See also Scanlon (2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a and 2003b). 
Contractualism has in addition been defended, for example, by Hirose 
(2001), Kumar (2000), Ridge (2001), Southwood (2010), Stratton-Lake 
(2003), and Suikkanen (2004, 2005, and 2014). 
7 This question has been debated in the rule-consequentialist literature 
(Brandt 1959, sec. 8, Brandt 1992: 149–154, Hooker 2000: sec. 3.3, 
Hooker and Fletcher 2008, Regan 1980, Ridge 2006 and 2009, and 
Smith (2010). Parfit (2011: vol. 1, 312–320) discusses this objection in 
the context of Kant’s Law of Nature Formula and rule-
consequentialism. Contractualists have not yet discussed this problem 
with the exception of Suikkanen (2014). 
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and why. The final section 3 then introduces and critically 
evaluates different responses to the counter-culture 
challenge. I will argue that there is a version of 
contractualism, Real World Contractualism, which can 
successfully deal with the objection. 
2. Levels of Social Acceptance and the Counter-
Culture Challenge 
When I introduced contractualism, I stipulated that 
everyone in the considered worlds has internalized the 
compared moral codes. That is, if the moral principle ‘Do 
not lie!’ belongs to the moral code that has been 
internalized in a given world, then absolutely everyone in 
that world has internalized this principle. As explained in 
footnote 1, this does not entail that no one lies in this 
world. It means only that everyone thinks in this world 
that lying is wrong, everyone is inclined not to lie, and 
everyone is disposed to blame people who lie and to feel 
guilty if they lie themselves. I hence assumed that the 
moral codes are compared at 100% level of social 
acceptance but not at 100% level of compliance. 
Comparing moral codes in this way is problematic for two 
reasons. Firstly, there are some principles that have very 
good consequences for individuals at 100% level of 
acceptance even if they are catastrophic in other 
circumstances (Parfit 2011: vol. 1, 315–316). For example, 
the rule “Do not be violent unless some other people 
endorse violent rules, in which case kill as many people as 
you can!” is benign in a world where everyone accepts 
non-violent rules but it would have horrific consequences 
in the real world where some people accept violence-
permitting principles. 
The second problem is that, as a consequence of 
comparing codes at 100% level of acceptance, 
contractualism is unable to account for many intuitively 
compelling moral requirements which we have in the non-
ideal circumstances (Hooker 2000: 82). For example, there 
are a number of moral requirements to do with how we 
are to treat people who have not internalized any moral 
principles. Intuitively we ought to help them to internalize 
the moral principles to which we are all committed. Call 
6 
 
these the duties of moral inculcation. There are also 
requirements to do with how we are to treat people who 
accept different moral principles than us. If someone 
disagrees with you about the moral status of cloning, you 
are not allowed to force that person to change her view by 
deception or coercion. Call this type of requirements the 
duties that govern moral disagreements. 
If we compared different moral codes at the 100% level of 
social acceptance, we could not explain the existence of 
the previous duties. In the compared worlds, there would 
be no need for moral inculcation and there would be no 
moral disagreements. Everyone has already internalized 
the same moral codes. Because of this, there are no reasons 
to add to the compared codes any principles that govern 
moral inculcation and dealing with moral disagreements. 
Such principles would only make the relevant codes more 
complicated and more difficult to internalize which would 
unnecessarily burden everyone (Hooker 2000: 96). This is 
why the moral code that could not be reasonably rejected 
in the universal acceptance comparisons would not 
contain any duties of moral inculcation or ones governing 
moral disagreements. As a consequence, universal 
acceptance contractualism could not explain why we have 
these duties in the real world. 
Contractualists should hence compare the relevant moral 
codes at a lower level of social acceptance. They could, for 
example, just stipulate a certain rate of imperfect 
acceptance. They could, thus, assume that an 
overwhelming majority of 90% accepts the relevant codes 
in the compared worlds (Hooker 2000: 84). These worlds 
would then contain some people who are violent, some 
people who are in the need of moral inculcation, and also 
some moral disagreements. We could then consider what 
consequences different principles that govern the use of 
violence, moral inculcation, and moral disagreements 
would have for the lives of the individuals in these 
worlds. 
The principle “Do not be violent unless some other people 
endorse violent moral rules, in which case kill as many 
people as you can!” would have disastrous consequences 
in these 90% worlds. Following it would lead to a vast 
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number of unnecessary deaths and for this reason this 
principle could surely be reasonably rejected. 
Consider then those worlds in which the 90% majority 
believes that it is wrong to allow human organs to be sold. 
Some of the remaining 10% will disagree with this moral 
belief, and so these 90% worlds will also contain moral 
disagreements. In some of these worlds, the 90% majority 
thinks that it is permissible to solve moral disagreements 
by deception, blackmail, and coercion whereas in others 
the vast majority believes that only rational persuasion is 
permissible. This difference in the majorities’ beliefs will 
then affect what kind of lives people come to live in the 
compared worlds. It might well be that solving 
disagreements by deception, blackmail, and coercion leads 
to unnecessary burdens and for this reason moral codes 
that permit people to behave in these ways in 
disagreements can be reasonably rejected. This illustrates 
how the contractualists can use the 90% level of 
acceptance to give an account of our duties that govern 
moral inculcation and moral disagreements. 
Contractualists have also other alternatives. Following 
Derek Parfit, they could compare the consequences of the 
internalization of different moral codes at every level of 
acceptance (Parfit 2011: vol. 1, 317). They could then hope 
that there is a moral code that is the least burdensome for 
individuals at every level of acceptance (that is, at 100% 
level of acceptance, at 99% level of acceptance, …, and at 
1% level of acceptance). Or, following Michael Ridge’s 
variable rate rule-utilitarianism, contractualists could 
consider how burdensome different codes are for 
individuals on average when we consider their 
consequences for individuals at every level of social 
acceptance (Ridge 2006 and 2009).  
Finally, contractualists could also think that each code 
generates its own equilibrium level of social acceptance 
depending on the strength of its duties of moral 
inculcation. For example, codes that contain demanding 
inculcation elements will create high levels of social 
acceptance whereas codes with more laissez-faire 
inculcation elements will be able to sustain only low levels 
of social acceptance. We could then compare how 
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burdensome these codes are for individuals at their 
equilibrium levels (Smith 2010: sec. 2; Suikkanen 2014).  
I will be neutral between these answers to the question of 
at what level of social acceptance moral codes should be 
compared. I will assume that contractualists need to 
compare moral codes at some level of social acceptance 
n% where 0<n<100. Here n might be a set level, a different 
level for each code depending on what kind inculcation 
element the code contains, or a short-hand for a whole set 
of levels of social acceptance at which the codes are to be 
compared. I want to focus, instead, on a new challenge 
which we face when we compare moral codes at a lower 
than 100% level of acceptance.  
When we compare moral codes at a lower than 100% level 
of acceptance, we will need to answer two questions. The 
first easy question is: who are the individuals who have 
not internalized the relevant moral codes in the compared 
worlds? Answering this question is important because it 
could well be that a given code has one set of 
consequences if one group of people internalizes it and 
another set of consequences if a different group does so.  
We can begin from the idea that it is possible to rank 
people in terms of how naturally they internalize moral 
codes. This ability is based on the individuals’ genes 
which are responsible for their innate cognitive and 
emotional capabilities. The idea then is that the non-
internalizers in the compared worlds are those individuals 
who share the innate features of the group of people who 
are the hardest to inculcate in the real world. 
The more difficult question is the counter-culture 
challenge itself (Smith 2010: 426–432). When we compare 
different moral codes at n% of social acceptance, the 
people who have not internalized the same moral code as 
the majority must have some beliefs, cares and concerns, 
values, emotions, and motivational and behavioural 
dispositions. Let us call these individuals code-rejectors and 
the previous sets of attitudes and dispositions counter-
cultures.  
The crux of the challenge is that the counter-cultures 
internalized by the code-rejectors will influence what 
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consequences the compared moral codes will have for the 
lives of different individuals, because different counter-
cultures make the code-rejectors behave in different ways 
in reaction to other people. The final part of the objection 
is that there is no non-arbitrary way of choosing which 
counter-culture has been adopted in the compared worlds 
by the code-rejectors (Smith 2010: 428). As a consequence, 
the comparisons of the moral codes in the contractualist 
framework will be arbitrary and for this reason 
contractualism will be unable to explain which actions are 
right and wrong and why (Smith 2010: 432). This objection 
seems to undermine the foundations of the whole 
contractualist project. 
One part of this challenge needs to be explained more. We 
can ask: how could the adopted counter-cultures affect 
what consequences different codes have for the lives of the 
individuals in the compared worlds? Let us consider a 
simple example.  
Consider two counter-cultures: Lazies and Crazies.8 Lazies 
fail to count as people who have internalized a moral code 
because they never want to do anything. They have no 
desire to help other people, keep promises, tell the truth, 
pay taxes, and so on. Crazies, in contrast, want to cause as 
much chaos as possible. They are strongly disposed to kill, 
rape, abuse, lie, cheat, and steal. In this situation, it is easy 
to see that moral codes can have very different 
consequence depending on whether the code-rejectors are 
Lazies or Crazies.  
Take the moral principle according which it is permissible 
to carry, buy, and sell fire-arms. In the Lazy counter-
culture worlds, the adoption of this principle will not have 
any harmful consequences. The Lazies are just too 
anaemic to use the available fire-arms to harm anyone. 
Thus, if we consider the previous principle in the Lazy 
worlds, this principle could probably not be reasonably 
rejected by anyone.  Things look very different if we 
consider this same principle in the Crazy worlds. In them, 
the Crazies are inclined to shoot people if they have an 
                                                
8 I borrow the names from Van Parijs (1991: 105) even if my characters 
are different from his.  
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access to fire-arms and so, in this context, the relevant 
moral permission would have disastrous consequences. It 
would result in some individuals getting shot and 
therefore in the Crazy worlds this principle could 
probably be reasonably rejected. 
This means that whichever counter-culture we stipulate to 
have been internalized by the code-rejectors now 
determines whether or not it is morally permissible to 
carry, buy, and sell fire-arms. The crux of the counter-
culture challenge is that there is no non-arbitrary way of 
specifying which counter-culture we should use in this 
type of comparisons. If that is true, then contractualism is 
unable to lead to non-arbitrary conclusions about right 
and wrong.  
3. Contractualist Responses to the Counter-Culture 
Challenge 
3.1 The Reflective Equilibrium Response 
The first contractualist response to the counter-culture 
challenge relies on the reflective equilibrium method. Its 
basic idea is that the ultimate aim of ethical theorizing is to 
formulate a theory which best coheres with our carefully 
considered moral convictions about individual cases.9 In 
the case of contractualism, this means that our task is to 
specify a contractualist framework for comparing moral 
codes such that its output code will cohere with our moral 
convictions. It is then thought that the resulting fit 
between our carefully considered moral convictions and 
the moral theory can both (i) justify believing that the 
moral theory is correct and (ii) vindicate our moral 
convictions from a more theoretical perspective.  
According to the reflective equilibrium response, in the 
contractualist comparisons of codes, we are therefore to 
use the counter-culture – whichever it is – which will 
ensure that the output moral code will match our carefully 
considered moral convictions. Here we explicitly use our 
pre-theoretical moral convictions to choose a suitable 
                                                
9 See Daniels (1979), Hooker (2000: 9–16), and Rawls (1971: 19–21 and 
46–51). For objections, see Brandt (1979: 21–22) and Hare (1973). 
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counter-culture for the contractualist comparisons of 
moral codes. As a consequence, the counter-culture used 
in the contractualist framework will not be arbitrary 
because the counter-culture is chosen specifically for the 
reason that it enables us to reach a reflective equilibrium 
between the moral code picked out by the contractualist 
framework and our moral convictions.  
This solution has a significant cost: it leads back to the 
redundancy objection (footnote 5, objection (i)). 
Contractualists aim to provide an illuminating 
explanation of which actions are right and wrong and 
why (Scanlon 1998: 10–13; Southwood 2010: 7–12). In 
order to achieve this aim, contractualism should be able to 
justify our carefully considered pre-theoretical moral 
convictions from a perspective that does not directly 
depend on those convictions themselves. Contractualists 
are able to satisfy this constraint only if they do not 
directly rely on the carefully considered moral convictions 
when they formulate and apply the reasonable rejection 
test (Hooker 2003: 57–62; Parfit 2003: 370; Parfit 2011: vol. 
1: §54). 
If contractualists use the reflective equilibrium response to 
the counter-culture challenge, they are no longer able to 
provide the required kind of independent explanation of 
rightness and wrongness. In giving this response, 
contractualists would rely on their moral convictions 
within the formulation of the reasonable rejectability 
test.10 In this situation, the contractualist framework and 
its output moral code would become a spare wheel that 
does no work: the theory would rely too much on our pre-
theoretical moral convictions to play a useful role in 
explaining what is right and wrong. Contractualism 
would lack both (i) the ability to offer a critical perspective 
for evaluating our carefully considered moral convictions 
and (ii) the ability to justify our moral convictions from a 
more theoretical independent perspective. For this reason, 
                                                
10 This problem resembles an objection to Rawls’s theory of justify. It 
is argued that Rawls selects the features of the Original Position on 
the basis of pre-theoretical moral assumptions about what is just that 
have not yet been vindicated by that test (Kymlicka 1991: 193).  
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if contractualists have any critical and explanatory 
ambitions, they need a better response. 
3.2 The Human Nature Response 
I assumed earlier that our genes determine how easily we 
internalize moral codes. This idea could also be used for 
responding to the counter-culture challenge. It could be 
claimed that there is a genetically determined ‘human 
nature’, which is an outcome of an evolutionary struggle 
for survival. This human nature consists of a set of beliefs, 
cares and concerns, values, emotions, and motivational 
and behavioural dispositions which we human beings 
have innately due to our evolved biological nature. 
It could then be suggested that morality is a cultural 
construct: a system of new beliefs, cares and concerns, 
values, emotions, and motivational and behavioural 
dispositions that is a human invention and culturally 
transmitted from one generation to the next. Its function 
could be argued to be to reign in our uninhibited, selfish, 
and often destructive natural inclinations so that we all 
will be better off as a result (Alexander 1987; Dawkins 
1976). The response to the counter-culture challenge 
would then be that the people who have not internalized 
the relevant moral codes in the compared worlds are 
unaffected by any culture. Their genetically fixed human 
nature determines how they think and what they do. We 
then compare the consequences of different moral codes in 
worlds in which the code-rejectors act purely on the basis 
of their biological human nature. 
This response has several problems. Firstly, we should be 
suspicious of the idea that there is a robust genetically 
fixed human nature which determines how individuals 
think and behave when they are unaffected by culture. 
There are good reasons to doubt whether biological and 
genetic determinism is true (James 2011: 5). Some believe 
that evolution itself has given us a general ability to 
decide whether we are to act on the inclinations and 
preferences which our genes and cultural environment 
provide for us (de Lazari-Radek & Singer 2014: 182–183). 
If this were correct, there would be no biological human 
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nature which determined how people behave when they 
are not influenced by culture.  
We should also be sceptical about whether our biological 
human nature is genuinely uninhibited, selfish, and 
destructive. Perhaps there is instead a way of reconciling 
our biological nature and being moral. This would mean 
that we have the beliefs, cares and concerns, values, 
emotions, and motivational and behavioural dispositions 
that are considered to be broadly speaking moral because 
having an altruistic nature was an evolutionary 
advantage.11 It sustained co-operation which helped our 
kin and genetic material to survive.  
In this situation, the human nature response would lead to 
unintuitive conclusions about what is right and wrong. If 
we accept that the biological human nature is 
fundamentally good, then the code-rejectors would still be 
pretty decent people morally speaking. In fact, their views 
and behaviour would not differ much from the views and 
behaviour of the vast majorities who have internalized the 
moral codes of the compared worlds. As a consequence, 
the least burdensome code would need to contain only 
weak moral principles governing moral inculcation and 
moral disagreements.  
Things get even worse for this response. In addition to the 
potentially biologically determined types of wrong-doing, 
there are also invented types. Consider female genital 
mutilation. The willingness to take part in this practice 
cannot have an evolutionary origin given that most 
human groups have never participated in this practice.  
Let us then compare different moral principles in worlds 
in which the counter-culture is determined solely by the 
biological human nature of the code-rejectors. In this 
situation, in the world in which the least burdensome code 
has been accepted, the n% majority of people are against 
female genital mutilation. Codes which endorse this 
                                                
11 Even if we probably did not evolve to internalize a universal 
principle of benevolence, there is good empirical evidence that we did 
evolve to be altruistic towards some limited group around us (Sober 
& Sloan Wilson 1998). 
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practice cause unnecessary suffering to women and for 
this reason such codes can be reasonably rejected. 
However, in the worlds we are now considering, the 
individuals who have not internalized the majority code 
would not be inclined to take part in this horrific practice 
either. Presumably there is nothing in their human nature 
that would make them do so.  
As a consequence, the non-rejectable code would not 
include any principles that govern what we ought to do in 
our actual world when we face other cultures that practice 
female genital mutilation. This means that the non-
rejectable code would not, for example, require us to 
confront those who take part in this clearly immoral 
practice. Such additional requirement would not have any 
consequences in the compared worlds because these 
worlds only include a uniform majority culture and 
people who act solely on the basis of their human nature. 
Hence, the human nature response to the counter-culture 
challenge fails too. 
3.3 The Expected Burdensomeness Response 
The next alternative is to compare moral codes with the 
n% internalization rate with all possible counter-cultures 
and their combinations. Not only should we compare the 
moral codes in worlds in which the code-rejectors are 
Lazies, but we should also compare these codes in worlds 
populated by Crazies, anarchists, paedophiles, 
psychopaths, Mafiosos, religious fundamentalist, and 
every possible combination of these and other possible 
counter-cultures. We would thus need to consider what 
consequences different moral codes have in the 
uncountably many different worlds in which the code-
rejectors have accepted different counter-cultures. How 
could we then decide which moral code is not reasonably 
rejectable? 
Answering this question is easy for the rule-
consequentialists. They can calculate how much expected 
value different moral codes have in this vast set of 
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possible worlds with different counter-cultures.12 Rule-
consequentialists can consider the consequences of a given 
moral code being internalized by n% of people in a world 
populated by a certain counter-culture as one outcome. 
They can then add together the value this outcome 
contains – call this sum in the world x “Vx”. Let s be the 
number of different worlds with different counter-
cultures. The expected value of a given moral code would 
thus be [(1/s)*V1]+[(1/s)*V2]+…+[(1/s)*Vs]. Rule-
consequentialists would then claim that an action is right 
if and only if it is authorized by the moral code that 
maximizes the amount of expected value in the 
comparisons of different codes at n% level of social 
acceptance in the set of worlds with different counter-
cultures. 
Contractualists will not be able to give this same answer to 
the previous question because it requires interpersonally 
aggregating the value of the consequences which each 
code and counter-culture pair has for different 
individuals. Contractualists do, however, have three other 
alternatives. For the sake of simplicity, let us compare just 
two moral codes A and B at n% level of internalization. 
Imagine also that p, q, and r are the only possible counter-
cultures which the code-rejectors could adopt. As a result, 
each moral code and counter-culture pair [A, p], [A, q], [A, 
r], [B, p], [B, q] and [B, r] will create different kind of lives 
for the individuals in the compared worlds.  
The first alternative is that we first find the most 
burdensome life from the three worlds [A, p], [A, q], and 
[A, r] and the most burdensome life from the world [B, p], 
[B, q], and [B, r]. We then compare which one of these two 
lives is more burdensome. If it is one of the A world lives, 
then the code A can be reasonably rejected and B cannot 
be. This is because no one needs to experience as 
burdensome life in any of the B worlds as someone has to 
experience in one of the A worlds.  
                                                
12 This is an application of the basic insight of Ridge’s variable rate-
utilitarianism to the counter-cultures instead of the levels of social 
acceptance (Ridge 2006 and 2009: sec. 5). 
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This solution fails for a simple reason. A code can produce 
very good lives for everyone with all but one counter-
culture with which it produces a very burdensome life for 
just one individual. Thus, it could well be that this code 
has truly horrible consequences for the life of only one 
individual only if a very bizarre counter-culture is 
internalized by the 100-n% minority. The current proposal 
would entail that this code could still be reasonably 
rejected by that one individual. This is unacceptable. The 
individual in question would have no reason to reject the 
considered code because with almost all counter-cultures 
that code has excellent consequences even for her. 
The second alternative is to consider the ‘expected 
maximum burdensomeness’ of the different codes 
(EMB).13 According to this proposal, when we consider 
code A, we first locate the most burdensome individual 
life from the pairs [A, p], [A, q], and [A, r]. We then 
multiply the burdensomeness of these individual lives 
with the probability of the relevant counter-cultures (if 
each counter-culture is equally probable, by 1/3 in my 
example) and we finally add these products together.  
The problem with this solution is that it is difficult to 
connect it to a plausible contractualist account of the 
nature and role of reasonable rejectability. One 
fundamental contractualist insight is that we have reasons 
not to act wrongly because wrongful actions cannot be 
justified to each and every other individual (Scanlon 1998: 
153–158; Parfit 2003: 371–374).14 Contractualists then claim 
that what can be justified to each and every individual is 
determined by which moral code individuals could not 
reasonably reject on the basis of the consequences which 
alternative moral codes have for them as individuals 
(Scanlon 1998: 229 – 241; Parfit 2003; Ridge 2001). If 
contractualists give up this personal criterion of 
                                                
13 I thank Campbell Brown for the distinction between EMB and MEB. 
14 Being able to justify your actions to each and every other person is 
then argued to constitute a valuable relationship of “mutual 
recognition” towards other people and the value of this relationship is 




reasonable rejectability, it seems like they will need to give 
up their story of why we should not act wrongly. 
Under EMB, the moral code A could be reasonably 
rejected as a consequence of a combination of what 
happens to Peter in the [A, p] world, to Quintin in the [A, 
q] world, and to Rita in the [A, r] world. Such a combined 
burden experienced by different individuals has very little 
to do with what can be justified to Peter, Quintin, or Rita 
as individual persons. For each one of them as 
individuals, A can be a good code except in the context of 
just one counter-culture. For this reason, it does not look 
like contractualists could coherently accept this response. 
Giving this response requires bringing back through the 
back-door interpersonal aggregations of burdens which 
contractualists insist on avoiding. 
The third alternative is to compare the ‘maximum 
expected burdensomeness’ (MEB) of moral codes in the 
current framework. According to MEB, for each 
individual and a moral code, we consider how 
burdensome that particular code would be for that 
particular individual in the context of each potential 
counter-culture. Thus, in the case Peter and the code A in 
the previous example, we consider how burdensome 
Peter’s life is in the worlds [A, p], [A, q], and [A, r]. We 
then first multiply the burdensomeness of Peter’s life in 
each of these scenarios by the likelihood of those scenarios 
(by 1/3 in this example assuming that all the counter-
cultures are equally likely) and we then form a sum of 
these products. This process does not require any 
interpersonal aggregation. It only requires intrapersonal 
aggregation of burdens for individual persons, which 
contractualists accept more generally (Scanlon 1998: 237). 
For each code, we then identify the person for whom that 
code has the highest expected burdensomeness calculated 
in the way just explained. If the code A produces a higher 
expected burdensomeness for some individual than B 
does for anyone, then A can be reasonably rejected and B 
cannot be.  
This proposal could probably be connected to a plausible 
contractualist account of reasonable rejectability. This is 
because according to it only particular individuals can 
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reasonably reject a moral code as a consequence of what 
the code does to them personally in different 
environments. Despite this, this response faces three 
serious challenges. 
Firstly, this response suffers from an awkward technical 
problem. When we calculate the expected 
burdensomeness of a code for an individual we have to 
take into account how probable different counter-cultures 
are. We can either think that all counter-cultures and their 
combinations are equally likely or that some are likelier 
than others. The problem with the first alternative is that 
there are uncountably many different possible and bizarre 
counter-cultures which no one has internalized in the real 
world. If we let each one of these counter-cultures to have 
an equal influence on which moral code could not be 
reasonably rejected, then the non-rejectable moral code 
could include very strange moral requirements that would 
also apply to us in the real world. This is why it seems like 
a bad idea to consider each counter-culture to be equally 
likely in the contractualist comparisons.  
This means that we should consider some of the possible 
counter-cultures to be more likely than others. What could 
such likelihoods represent? The only non-arbitrary way to 
answer this question is to claim that the likelihood in 
question stands for how likely it is that the relevant 
counter-cultures would be internalized in the actual world 
by those who do not accept the conventional morality. 
This leads to the second problem of the current proposal. 
This proposal is threating to become too demanding 
epistemically. The current proposal is that an action is 
right if and only if it is authorized by the moral code 
which could not be reasonably rejected because it 
minimizes the maximum personal burdensomeness 
expectation. In order to know that an action is right in this 
framework, we would first need to know what 
consequences every possible moral code would have for 
the lives of individuals at n% level of internalization in 
uncountably many worlds in which the different counter-
culture have been internalized by the code-rejectors. This 
means that we would need to know how each possible 
moral code interacts with even the most bizarre counter-
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cultures. We would also need to know how likely it is that 
each one of these counter-cultures would be accepted in 
the actual world by those who do not accept the 
conventional morality. All this information would be 
difficult to come by.  
Finally, there are also worries about how comfortably the 
current proposal actually fits the contractualist accounts of 
reasonable rejectability. Recall that contractualists are 
motivated by the moral ideal that we should be able to 
justify our actions to each and every individual. Consider 
then James who demands that you to justify to him the 
way you have treated him in some concrete situation. 
According to the current proposal, the justification which 
you should give to James is a function of what 
consequences moral codes have for different individuals 
in a vast number of worlds populated by code-rejectors 
who accept different counter-cultures – some of which are 
very alien from the perspective of the real world. It is less 
clear just how these considerations could satisfy James’s 
legitimate demand that you should be able to justify your 
actions to him on grounds he could not reasonably reject. 
The current response to the counter-culture challenge thus 
seems too far removed from the original contractualist 
moral ideal of justification.  
We can therefore conclude that the different responses to 
the counter-culture challenge that rely on the idea of 
expected burdensomeness are problematic. They face 
awkward theoretical questions about probabilities, they 
have implausible normative consequences, they are 
epistemically demanding, and they fail to fit the 
contractualist account of justifiability to each and every 
person.  
3.4 Real World Contractualism 
Finally, I want to introduce a response to the counter-
culture challenge, which I believe is more plausible than 
the previous alternatives. I will first introduce this 
proposal and then explain why it can avoid the main 
problems of the previous three responses. 
By definition, “conventional morality” is the moral code 
which in fact has been internalized by the majority of 
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people at the moment in the actual world. Given that we 
are using the notion of a moral code to stand for a 
complex moral sensitivity (footnote 1) and there are 
always small differences between different people’s moral 
sensitivities, it is admittedly somewhat vague just which 
moral beliefs, cares and concerns, values, emotions, 
behavioural and motivational dispositions, and patterns of 
reactive attitudes you need to have in order to count as 
someone who accepts the conventional morality. Despite 
this, there inevitably is (i) a majority of people in the 
actual world who has definitely internalized the 
conventional morality, (ii) a minority who definitely 
hasn’t done so, and (iii) borderline cases of people who do 
not determinately belong to either (i) or (ii).  
Let us then consider all the actual people who have 
definitely not internalized the conventional morality.15 
The members of this group have internalized different 
counter-cultures. We can, for example, find psychopaths, 
paedophiles, extreme egoists, anarchists, and religious 
fundamentalists from this group. It is also possible to 
empirically investigate what percentage of this group 
accepts a given counter-culture. This means that x% of the 
actual people who have not internalized the conventional 
morality are psychopaths, y% are anarchists, z% are 
religious fundamentalists, and so on. There is then a 
certain proportion of this actual group of code-rejectors 
that accepts each actual counter-culture. 
Real World Contractualism uses these facts to construct a 
response to the counter-culture challenge. We are 
comparing different moral codes in worlds in which n% of 
people have internalized the compared codes. The idea 
then is that the rest of the population in these worlds have 
accepted exactly the same counter-cultures as the people 
who have not internalized the conventional morality in 
the actual world. Furthermore, these counter-cultures are 
                                                
15 What about the people who neither determinately belong to this 
category nor to the category of people who have not internalized the 
conventional morality? We can either include all, some or none of 
them to the considered people. Whichever choice we make here, will 
not have much of an impact given that these individuals are very 
close to accepting the conventional morality. 
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accepted in the same proportion as the counter-cultures 
are accepted in the actual world by the actual code-
rejectors. This means that if x% of the people who have 
not internalized the conventional morality in the actual 
world are paedophiles, then the same x% of the people 
who belong to the 100-n% minority in the compared 
worlds are paedophiles, and similarly for all other 
countercultures we can find from the actual world. Thus, 
we get exactly the same counter-cultures in the compared 
worlds as we have in the actual world, and we get these 
counter-cultures in the same proportions as we find them 
from the actual world.16 
Let us then explore how this proposal avoids the problems 
of the previous proposals. Firstly, in response to Smith’s 
original counter-culture challenge, it is clear that we have 
not chosen the counter-cultures for the contractualist 
comparisons of moral codes arbitrarily. To see this, let us 
consider natural resources. Just like we can compare 
moral codes in the context of different counter-cultures, 
we could also compare these codes in worlds that have 
very few natural resources and in ones that are incredibly 
rich with resources. Despite this, contractualists compare 
moral codes only in worlds that have the same amount of 
natural resources as our world. 
Why exactly is this justified and not arbitrary? Presumably 
the thinking behind comparing codes only in worlds that 
have the same resources as our world is that we want the 
contractualist framework to generate moral principles that 
                                                
16 One interesting consequence of Real World Contractualism is that it 
makes what is right and wrong to a degree relative to time and 
perhaps even place given that different times and places in the actual 
world can have different actual counter-cultures. This view, thus, 
really makes for example the rightness and wrongness of carrying, 
buying, and selling fire-arms relative to the time and place. After all, 
whether the principles that would govern the availability of fire-arms 
can be reasonably rejected turn out to depend on what the actual 
members of the counter-cultures would do with the fire-arms. This 
can, of course, change in the actual world depending on time and 
place. I believe that this form of relativism and context-dependency 
will not be objectionable at least in any obvious way. It also nicely fits 
Scanlon’s own “parametric universalism”, which he defended in the 
often ignored chapter on relativism in What We Owe to Each Other 
(Scanlon 1998: ch. 8). 
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are relevant and applicable in the real world situations we 
face (Rawls 1971: 126–130). This is why it is not arbitrary 
to compare moral codes only in worlds that have the same 
amount of natural resources as our world.  
Real World Contractualism follows this same line of 
thought. It claims that we should compare moral codes in 
worlds that are populated by individuals who accept the 
genuine counter-cultures of the actual world. This is the 
only way to guarantee that the contractualist framework 
will generate moral principles that are relevant and 
applicable in our actual circumstances. If the decision to 
compare moral codes in the context of the actual amount 
of natural resources then is not arbitrary for this reason, 
then comparing these codes only in the context of actual 
counter-cultures should not be arbitrary either. In fact, we 
can treat the counter-cultures in the comparisons of moral 
codes very much like natural resources. 
Secondly, this proposal can avoid the redundancy 
objection, which was fatal for the reflective equilibrium 
response. Real World Contractualism does not rely on pre-
theoretical moral convictions in choosing which counter-
cultures are used in the relevant comparisons of moral 
codes. The unique combination of counter-cultures is used 
solely because we find it from the actual world. This is 
why Real World Contractualism can offer a critical 
perspective for both evaluating and vindicating our moral 
convictions, and why it can also play a role in explaining 
what is right and wrong and why. It can turn out that the 
moral code which is the least burdensome according to 
Real World Contractualism is in important respects 
different from our conventional morality. It can then be 
argued that following our moral convictions is burdening 
some individuals unnecessarily and for this reason we 
should correct our convictions to match the moral 
principles picked out by Real World Contractualism. 
Thirdly, my proposal does not make any claims about the 
human nature. If there is one, then we can expect that it is 
reflected in the actual counter-cultures. For this reason, 
Real World Contractualism is compatible with the idea 
that the behaviour of the code-rejectors in the compared 
worlds is at least in part determined by their human 
23 
 
nature. However, if we also find counter-cultures from the 
actual world that are not biologically determined, then 
Real World Contractualism will also take these counter-
cultures into account in the contractualist comparisons of 
moral codes. This is why the case of female genital 
mutilation will not be a problem for this proposal. 
Fourthly, Real World Contractualism will not require 
aggregating burdens of different individuals 
interpersonally in the comparisons of the moral codes. 
Only personal objections which concrete individuals can 
make to the moral code they live under in the described 
circumstances are taken into account.  
This idea leads to the fifth advantage of the proposal: it 
fits the standard contractualist accounts of reasonable 
rejectability. As explained, contractualists try to make 
sense of what can be justified to each and every individual 
person in terms of the principles which no individual 
could reasonably reject. The moral code picked out by 
Real World Contractualism fits this account. The general 
acceptance of any other code than the non-rejectable code 
would lead to more serious personal burdens for some 
individuals in the worlds that are populated by counter-
cultures exactly like the ones we find in the actual world. 
This is what you can say to James when he asks you to 
justify to him the way you have treated him. You can 
argue that the moral codes that would forbid you to act in 
the way that you did would all cause unnecessary 
burdens to some individuals in circumstances which are 
exactly like the ones we are in. This is something James 
should be concerned about as far as he grants other actual 
people an equal moral status. 
Finally, my proposal is less demanding epistemically than 
the expected burdensomeness responses. There will be no 
need to attempt to find out how likely the internalization 
of different counter-cultures is in the actual world. We 
also do not need to know what consequences different 
moral codes would have in bizarre counter-culture 
worlds. All we need to know is what kind of 
consequences different moral codes have in circumstances 
in which the code-rejectors are exactly like the people who 
don’t accept the conventional morality in the actual world.  
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We should not underestimate how difficult even this 
information is to acquire, but at least this is far less 
information than what is required by the expected 
burdensomeness responses. For one, we can already 
observe in the actual world what kind of consequences 
different conventional moral codes have for the lives of 
individuals in the circumstances in which the code-
rejectors accept the actual counter-cultures. This is why 
Real World Contractualism is epistemically less 
demanding than the expected burdensomeness responses 
that all require much more information about how 
different moral codes and counter-cultures interact.  
4. Conclusion 
If the previous arguments are along the right lines, then 
Real World Contractualism is the best available 
contractualist response to the counter-culture challenge 
because it can avoid the problems of the other alternatives. 
As a consequence, there is a well-defined and well-
motivated contractualist procedure for selecting which 
moral code could not be reasonably rejected. This means 
that an ethical theory based on such a code is still a serious 
candidate when we consider which ethical theory best 
captures which actions are right and wrong and why. 
Whether contractualism can ultimately be vindicated as 
the correct ethical theory will then depend on its other 
advantages and problems (see footnote 5) and on how 
they compare to the advantages and problems of other 
ethical theories. Here my aim was merely to provide a 
satisfactory response to the counter-culture challenge. 
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